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This paper argues that consideration of world inequality should cause us to re-examine 
the key concepts underlying the welfare approach to the measurement of income inequality 
and the inter-relation between the measurement of inequality and the measurement of 
poverty. There are three reasons why we feel that a re-examination is necessary: (i) the 
extent of global income differences means that we cannot simply carry over the methods 
used at a national level; we need a more flexible measure; (ii) we have to reconcile measures 
of world inequality and world poverty; and (iii) we need to explore more fully the different 
ways in which measures may be relative or absolute. This leads us to propose a new 
measure, which (a) combines poverty and inequality, including provision for those who are 
concerned only with poverty, (b) incorporates different approaches to the measurement of 
inequality; and (c) allows the cost of inequality to be expressed in different ways. Applied to 
the world distribution for the period 1820-1992, the new measure provides different 
perspectives on the evolution of global inequality. 
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There is currently a great deal of interest in the world distribution of income, as 
evidenced by the wide popular debate and by many academic articles (see the recent survey 
by Anand and Segal, 2008). People are keen to know whether world inequality is growing or 
declining. They want to monitor progress towards the eradication of world poverty, as in the 
UN Millennium Development Goals. The main argument of the present paper is that, before 
we can give empirical answers to these questions, we need to re-consider the conceptual basis 
of inequality and poverty measurement. In our view, the move to a world canvas should be 
the occasion for a fundamental re-examination of the underlying principles. While the issues 
we raise can apply also at a national level, their heightened significance at a global level 
means that we can no longer sweep them under the carpet. Starting from a critique of the 
standard inequality measures, we are led to propose a new approach to the measurement of 
global inequality and poverty. This paper is primarily about principles, but we illustrate their 
application by taking as a case study the data on the distribution of income among world 
citizens assembled by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) (referred to below as BM). 
There are three reasons why we believe that a re-examination is necessary. First, the 
differences between incomes are much larger on a world scale than nationally. The BM data 
show the decile ratio (the ratio of the top to bottom decile) for all world citizens in 1992 as 
24.7. The figure given by Gottschalk and Smeeding (1999, Figure 2) for the United States in 
1991 (for a different income concept) was 5.8; for Sweden it was 2.8, almost an order of a 
                                                           
1 This paper builds on Atkinson and Brandolini (2004), which contains analysis of international income 
inequality as well as world inequality, and considers the intermediate class of inequality measures. That paper 
was presented at the 28th General Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and 
Wealth (Cork, Ireland, 22-28 August 2004), at the 4th International Conference on the Capability Approach: 
Enhancing Human Security (Pavia, Italy, 5-7 September 2004) and in a seminar at the University of Bari. We 
are most grateful to Conchita D’Ambrosio for her discussion of the paper at Cork, to seminar participants in 
Cork, Pavia and Bari for helpful observations, to Stephen Jenkins for invaluable comments that led us to recast 
the paper, and to François Bourguignon and Peter Lambert for their excellent suggestions regarding this version. 
Further helpful remarks have been made by Luigi Cannari, Fabrice Murtin, Alessandro Secchi, and Paul Segal. 
This version of the paper was presented at the conference to celebrate the 70th birthday of Sir James Mirrlees, 
and we are grateful to him and other participants for their most helpful comments. We thank Federico Giorgi for 
excellent research assistance. The paper was essentially completed during Atkinson’s visit to the Economic 
Research Department of the Bank of Italy in 2006. The views expressed here are solely ours; in particular, they 
do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy.  
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magnitude less than the global figure. This means that, in order to measure world inequality, 
we have to evaluate a much wider range of incomes than found in the typical advanced OECD 
country. (The move to a global scale is our focus here, but there are countries where the 
within-country income differences are much wider than in the United States, and the 
argument made here may also be seen as questioning the use of standard inequality measures 
within those countries.) As we discuss in Section 3, standard inequality measures impose too 
tight a straitjacket when we seek to apply them both to within-country differences and to 
differences across the world. We need more flexibility than can be accommodated with a 
single parameter, which is why the new measure proposed in Section 4 has several 
parameters.  
The second reason is that we need to consider the relation between the measurement of 
income inequality and the measurement of poverty. People are interested in both world 
inequality and world poverty, but the two literatures run in parallel, rather than treating the 
subject in an integrated way (see Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1999). There is an uneasy 
relationship between the two analyses. The same criticism applies to studies at the national 
level but it is easier to avoid a confrontation of the two concepts when they are moving in the 
same direction, whereas at a global level we are faced with a situation where the proportion 
living below $1 a day is falling but the world Gini coefficient remains stubbornly high (see 
Figure 1 below). Do we give priority to one of the indicators? Some people have a 
lexicographic approach, giving total priority to poverty reduction, but others believe that there 
is some trade-off between the two concerns. One possibility could be to give an independent 
role to both inequality and poverty measures in a reduced-form social welfare function as 
discussed by Fields (2006) and Kanbur (2008). The new approach suggested here 
accommodates differences in weighting of poverty and inequality by devising a social welfare 
function that can be tilted towards either concept by varying its parameters; more 
fundamentally, it goes to the heart of the difference between the two concepts through the 
analysis of how the society values an extra dollar at different places of the income 
distribution.  
The third reason is that, on a global scale, we need to consider absolute as well as 
relative differences. In 2005 the real per capita income of China was US $4,091, or 1/10 of 
the US $41,674 of the United States (World Bank, 2008, Summary Table, pp. 23-7). This  
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means that China has to grow 10 times as fast as the United States to obtain the same absolute 
increase in the production of goods and services per head. Even if China grows faster in 
relative terms, the absolute gap may be widening. For example, with annual per capita growth 
rates of 5 per cent in China and 2 per cent in the United States, the absolute income gap 
between the two countries would widen for a further 49 years before starting to narrow, to 
finally disappear after 80 years. Concern for the absolute dimension of economic growth has 
far-reaching implications for the assessment of its distributive consequences, both between 
and within countries. As put by Livi Bacci, in commenting on Dollar and Kraay’s (2002) 
conclusions on the “pro-poor” effect of economic growth, “it is not much of a relief for 
somebody living with a dollar per day to see that his income up by 3 cents is growing as much 
as the income of the richest quintile” (2001, p. 114; our translation).  
At the empirical level, however, relative inequality measures predominate. We have 
never seen official publications reporting estimates of absolute inequality, and even academic 
studies are rare (one example is Del Río and Ruiz-Castillo, 2001). In the case of global 
income inequality, Chotikapanich et al. (1997), Schultz (1998), Bhalla (2002), Bourguignon 
and Morrisson (2002), Milanovic (2002), Dowrick and Akmal (2005) and Sala-i-Martin 
(2006) often take different routes, but they have in common a focus on relative measures of 
inequality. Anand and Segal (2008) focus their survey on relative global inequality. Firebaugh 
(2003, pp. 72-3) briefly deals with the question to make it clear that “[i]nequality pertains to 
proportionate share of some item – not to size differences”, and to avoid confusion he 
introduces the terms “widening and narrowing gaps” to refer to changing absolute differences. 
Only in two recent contributions has attention been drawn to the absolute/relative issue. 
Ravallion (2004) notes that “[w]hile relative inequality has been the preferred concept in 
empirical work in development economics, perceptions that inequality is rising may well be 
based on absolute disparities in living standards” (p. 19). He shows how the “virtually zero 
correlation” between the relative Gini index and income growth becomes a “strong positive 
correlation” when an absolute Gini index is employed. Svedberg (2004) highlights the 
importance of looking at the absolute distribution of income across countries, and concludes 
that “[t]o pay more heed to the growing absolute income gaps between rich and poor 
countries, and their consequences, seems an urgent task for future research into growth and 
distribution” (p. 28).  
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In Section 2 we consider the application of the standard approaches to the world 
distribution of income, and we highlight the contrasting findings regarding the trends in 
poverty, relative inequality, and the absolute cost of inequality. In order to understand this 
further, we seek to make explicit the “world social welfare function” underlying the exercises 
of measuring world income inequality and world poverty. The main tool in our analysis is the 
“social marginal valuation of income”, or the social value attached to an extra dollar received 
by people located at different points in the income distribution. Specification of the way in 
which the social marginal valuation of income changes over the income scale is the first key 
step in the choice of an inequality measure, but we also identify a second key step: the 
expression of the cost of inequality in relation to mean income. These two key steps underlie 
the construction of any inequality index, but in Section 3 we explain why we believe the 
standard approaches to the measurement of inequality fall short of being fully satisfactory 
when we seek to apply them over the whole range of world incomes, and why the same 
applies to the alternative, absolute, approach proposed by Kolm (1976). In effect, the existing 
measures impose too tight constraints on the way in which the social marginal valuation 
varies with income and provide no ready means to integrate the analysis of poverty and 
inequality. This leads us to propose, in Section 4, a new measure, grounded in an absolute 
approach, but more flexible in form. The flexibility not only allows us to encompass a wider 
range of variation of income, as found on a global scale, but also shows how different 
measures can be obtained as limiting cases (and hence how the different approaches can be 
blended together). The new measure, which differs in both of the key steps outlined above, is 
applied in Section 5 to the changes in the world distribution of income from 1820 to 1992. 
The data are not new – they are those of the BM dataset – but the application of the new 
approach suggested in this paper helps us understand the reasons why people reach different 
conclusions regarding the evolution of world inequality and poverty. The main arguments are 
summarised in Section 6. 
There is an important aspect that should be clarified at the outset. Consideration of the 
world distribution as a whole, as in the studies cited above, assumes that there is a single 
world evaluation function. The main, but not the only, way in which inequality measures have 
been interpreted is in terms of social welfare. Adopting for the purposes of this paper such a 
welfarist perspective (although we believe other approaches to inequality also to be important  
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– see Sen, 1992), the world social welfare function is posited to be a symmetric function 
) ,..., ( 1 n y y W  of the real (i.e. purchasing power adjusted) incomes yi of the n persons 
(households) in the world ranked by their income from the lowest y1 to the highest yn. There 
are assumed to be no other relevant differences between people apart from income,
2 which 
justifies the symmetry assumption. There is then a mapping from the properties of the world 
social welfare function to the properties of the inequality measure, and vice versa. But there is 
an important difference between the world distribution and the distribution within a country. 
The people 1 to n are not all part of the same political entity. In particular, redistributive 
mechanisms typically operate at the national level, and are much more limited at the global 
level. The formulator of the social objective in a particular country may feel different degrees 
of responsibility and hence treat differently people who belong to that country from those 
belonging to other countries. This may, for example, lead to people with (real) income y being 
considered poor if they come from country A but not if they come from country B. Such a 
differential treatment would however be inconsistent with there being a single symmetric 
world social welfare function. Some people would, for this reason, simply reject the idea of a 
world welfare function and hence any calculations of global inequality or global poverty (see 
for example Bhagwati, 2004). Here, our aim is to make sense of such calculations, which 
implicitly assume a symmetric world social welfare function, treating as irrelevant the country 
to which a person belongs. It is on this assumption that the following analysis is based. 
2. Applying standard indices to the world distribution 
The single most popular index applied to inequality measurement is the Gini coefficient 
(half the mean difference divided by the mean). Figure 1 shows its value for the world income 
distribution from 1820 to 1992 using the BM data, available at www.delta.ens.fr/XIX. 
Bourguignon and Morrisson’s method is to use evidence on the national distribution (or the 
distribution for a grouping of countries) about the income shares of decile groups, and the top 
5 per cent. The groups are treated as homogeneous, which means that the degree of overall 
                                                           
2 It should be noted that our analysis is entirely static, considering the level not the growth of income. As 
emphasised by Bourguignon, Levin and Rosenblatt (2006), and others, it is the dynamics of incomes with which 
many people are concerned. The welfare evaluation of income changes raises questions that we do not address.   
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inequality is under-stated. The distributional data are then combined with estimates of 
national GDP per head, expressed in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars at 
1990 prices, which are in turn derived from the historical time series constructed by Maddison 
(1995).
3 We do not discuss here the issues raised by such a method; nor do we consider more 
generally the issues of data reliability.
4 We take their estimates at face value. 
As Bourguignon and Morrisson show, the Gini coefficient rose almost continuously 
from 1820 to 1950 and then more or less levelled off between 1950 and 1992: “the burst of 
world income inequality now seems to be over. There is comparatively little difference 
between the world distribution today and in 1950” (2002, p. 742). If there is a Kuznets 
inverse-U curve for the world as a whole, then we are slow to enter the downward phase: see 
the Gini coefficient in Figure 1. On the other hand, measures of world poverty based on a 
constant purchasing power poverty standard show a steady, indeed accelerating, downward 
trend. Figure 1 shows the world poverty headcount calculated by Bourguignon and Morrisson 
applying a standard comparable with that of $1 a day used by the World Bank. 
“Relative” and “absolute” approaches 
The poverty measure in Figure 1 represents an “absolute” approach, in that the poverty 
line is fixed in terms of purchasing power, while a “relative” approach would make it 
proportional to the median or the mean of the distribution. However, an “absolute” approach 
does not imply that the line must be kept constant over time, as discussed below. This suggest 
that we need to be careful in the use of the word “absolute”, which may take on different 
meanings, as shown by Foster (1998) in the context of poverty measurement. A different 
usage arises in the case of inequality measurement. Following Kolm (1976), inequality 
measures are described as “relative” when they are invariant to proportional transformations 
(scale invariance), and “absolute” when they are invariant to additive transformations 
                                                           
3 These estimates of GDP per head have subsequently been revised by Maddison (2003), but we retain the 
original values of the BM dataset.  
4 See, for instance, Deaton’s critical remark: “the differences in coverage and definition between NAS [National 
Accounts] and surveys mean that, even if everything were perfectly measured, it would be incorrect to apply 
inequality or distributional measures which are defined from surveys, which measure one thing, to means that 
are derived from the national accounts, which measure another” (2005, p. 17). On the reliability of compilations 
of income distribution statistics see Atkinson and Brandolini (2001).  
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(translation invariance). The Gini coefficient described above is “relative”. If all incomes are 
doubled in terms of purchasing power, then the Gini coefficient is unchanged: it is the relative 
mean difference. On the other hand, there are good reasons for considering absolute income 
levels. The effect of the doubling of real incomes from their 2005 values would be that the per 
capita income of the United States remained 10 times that of China, but that the absolute 
difference increased from US $37,583 to US $75,166. The world would be getting richer, but 
the differences between countries would be becoming larger in absolute terms. One way in 
which this can be reflected is by taking, not the relative mean difference, but the absolute 
mean difference, or the “absolute Gini coefficient”, shown in Figure 1 by the line marked by 
crosses. The absolute mean difference has increased throughout the period, accelerating 
upwards after 1950. This alternative – rather neglected – measure of inequality certainly gives 
a rather different perspective on the evolution of the world distribution. If the $1 a day 
poverty headcount is the “optimistic” view of recent decades of the world distribution, the 
absolute Gini is the “pessimistic” view. 
Representing different social values 
The results in Figure 1 provide some explanation as to why people may reach different 
conclusions about what is happening to the world distribution. We may look at poverty or 
inequality, and we may think of inequality in relative or absolute terms. This suggests that we 
should seek to reflect differences in social judgments in the functional form of the world 
social welfare function. Indeed, Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) show how alternative 
inequality indices may record different directions of change: the period from 1980 to 1992 
saw the mean logarithmic deviation fall, the Theil index rise, and the Gini coefficient remain 
virtually unchanged. Different social values can be incorporated by using functional forms, 
such as those listed above, or by allowing a parameter to vary within a specific functional 
form. We adopt the second approach, since it makes more transparent the underlying social 
values. 
The constant elasticity index, I, introduced by Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970) allows 
users to choose different values of the elasticity, reflecting differing views about the weights 
to be applied to changes at different points in the income distribution. The index, which is 
















































































where yi denotes the income of person i in a population of n people with mean income μ. 
People are assumed to be ranked by increasing income, so that i indicates their position in the 
income distribution. Here, and throughout the paper, we are assuming that income is strictly 
positive. As ε rises, more weight is given to inequality. Where  1 = ε , the second version of the 
formula applies, and I is equal to 1 minus the ratio of the geometric mean to the arithmetic 
mean. Where  2 = ε , the value of I is higher since it is equal to 1 minus the ratio of the 
harmonic mean to the arithmetic mean. 
The index I can be interpreted as expressing the cost of inequality in terms of the 
proportionate amount of income that could be subtracted from the mean without affecting the 
level of social welfare, i.e.  μ − = / 1
I
e y I , where
I
e y  is referred to as the “equally-distributed 
equivalent income”, which can be written as  ) 1 ( I − μ . It is important to note that this 
formulation involves two distinct steps, with choices to be made at each stage, and this two-
step distinction recurs throughout the paper. The first key step is the specification of the 
function of individual incomes that is added across individuals. In effect, we are adding 
across individuals  ) 1 /(
1 ε −
ε −
i y , where division by  ) 1 ( ε −  ensures a non-decreasing function. 
(The degree of concavity of this function, captured by ε, embodies the chosen distributional 
values, as discussed further below.) Let us denote this sum, divided by n, by Σ, referred to 
below as the additive element of the social welfare function. The second key step in the 
measurement of inequality is to take a function of Σ and the mean income μ, to arrive at an 
interpretable formulation. In the case of the index I, the concave transformation is first 
reversed, to give 
) 1 /( 1 ] ) 1 [(
ε − Σ ε − , and then divided by μ and subtracted from 1 to give I. The 
index I thus expresses the cost of inequality as the proportionate shortfall of the equally 
distributed income from the mean. This is however a choice. The cost could be expressed 
differently, as we discuss below. The two-step process has been described for the constant 
elasticity index, but applies generally, including to non-additive forms of Σ, such as that  
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embodied in the Gini coefficient, G. In that case,  ) 1 ( G − μ  gives the equally distributed 
equivalent income, or what Sen (1976) called “real national income”: μ is a measure of the 
aggregate economic performance, and  ) 1 ( G −  is the discount applied on account of the cost 
of inequality.  
An increase in the income of person i raises social welfare, and we can define the social 
marginal valuation of income as the value placed on an additional dollar received by a 
particular person. In the case of the constant elasticity index, I, rather than taking social 
welfare as being represented by the equally-distributed equivalent income 
) 1 /( 1 ] ) 1 [(
ε − Σ ε − =
I
e y , 
we take its ordinally equivalent representation constituted by the additive element Σ. The 
social marginal valuation of income  i y  is hence equal to 
ε −
i y .
5 The elasticity (defined 
positively) of the social marginal valuation of income is constant and equal to ε. For the index 
I, the marginal valuation tends to infinity as income goes to zero and to zero as income goes 
to infinity. For the Gini coefficient, G, the social marginal valuation of income is given by 
] / ) 1 2 ( 2 [ n i− − , where i is the person’s rank in the income distribution, and n is the total 
number of people.
6 For the poorest person, with  1 = i , the value is  n / 1 2− , which approaches 
2 as n becomes large; for the median person (with n odd) it is 1; and for the richest person the 
marginal value is  n / 1 , which approaches zero as n becomes large. For both indices I and G, 
the social marginal valuation is non-negative and non-increasing. 
The index I has been criticised for being, like the Gini coefficient, a relative measure: 
measured inequality is unchanged when all incomes are increased (or decreased) in the same 
proportion. As we have seen, it is a matter of concern at the global level that equal rates of 
growth in all countries imply widening absolute gaps. Kolm (1976) introduced the absolute 
index  
                                                           
5 Throughout the paper we define the social welfare function in per capita terms rather than in its aggregate 
form, which implies that the social marginal valuation of income is divided through by n. Since what matters are 
the relative valuations of incomes i and j rather than their absolute values, we ignore in much of what follows 
the division by n, which affects equally all incomes, referring to the individual social marginal valuation of 
income. Note that the definition of social welfare in per capita terms has important implications for the 
interpretation of welfare changes when the population is growing. See footnote 19 below. 
6 This follows from writing the social welfare function as μ(1–G) and G as Σi(2i–n–1)yi/n
2μ, with incomes yi’s 
ranked from the lowest to the highest. On the social welfare function implicit in the Gini coefficient see 
Sheshinski (1972), Sen (1976) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1978).  
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The index K is absolute in the sense described earlier that inequality is unaffected by an equal 
addition to (or subtraction from) all incomes. With constant relative growth rates, inequality 
would increase.  
As Kolm clearly recognised (1976, pp. 437-8), his use of the index K involves two, 
distinct departures, corresponding to the two key steps in the formulation described earlier. 
The first involves the different functional form in the additive element Σ: exponential rather 
than iso-elastic. The second involves expressing the cost of inequality in absolute rather than 
relative terms. The index K represents the cost of inequality defined as the absolute amount of 
income that could be subtracted from the mean without affecting the level of social welfare, 
i.e. 
K
e y K − μ = , where
K
e y  is the equally distributed equivalent income, equal to  K − μ  (see 
also Blackorby and Donaldson, 1980). We say that inequality costs $X billion, rather than x 
per cent of total income. In this respect, it is parallel to the absolute Gini coefficient. Equally, 
we can express the measures I in absolute terms (μI), or the measures K as a proportion of 
mean income. (The reason why we can normalise the cost in this way is that we are 
considering an equally distributed equivalent distribution, and in this case absolute and 
proportional changes in the distribution are identical.) 
The index K, like the index I, contains a free parameter κ which captures inequality 
aversion.
7 The larger κ, the higher the weight attributed to the lowest incomes; when κ tends 
to infinity, K tends to the difference  ) ( 1 y − μ  between the mean income and the lowest 
income y1. The individual social marginal valuation of income, as before computed from the 
additive element of the social welfare function, is given by  ) exp( i y κ − , and its elasticity with 
respect to income, defined positively, is equal to κy. The elasticity is increasing with income. 
Moreover, if we specify the elasticity at a particular value of income, then we can deduce the 
                                                           
7 The Kolm index, and more generally any non-relative measure, is not unit invariant: a change in the unit of 
account of the incomes affects measured inequality, even if the underlying distribution is unaltered. The Kolm 
index is criticised on this account by Zheng (2007), who goes on to propose an approach based on a new axiom 
of unit consistency requiring that income inequality rankings be preserved as the unit of account varies. Here we 
adopt the simpler approach of taking account of the definition of units in the choice of κ.  
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value of κ. If, for example, the elasticity is set equal to 1 at the mean income, then κ would 
equal the reciprocal of the mean.
8 
In empirical applications, we have to consider the choice of the parameters ε and κ. 
Researchers using the constant elasticity index I have taken a range of values. The US Census 
Bureau (for example, 2000, p. 7) publishes income distribution statistics taking values of 
0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 (it also suggests that 1.0 is the maximum permissible value, although we 
can see from the expression for I that this is not the case). In his study for the OECD, Sawyer 
(1976) used values of 0.5 and 1.5. Mirrlees (1978) proposed that we apply an “inverse square 
law”:  2 = ε . One way to pin down these values is by resorting to estimates of the social 
preferences implicit in taxation systems. Christiansen and Jansen (1978) estimated the 
elasticity of the social marginal value of income implicit in the Norwegian system of indirect 
taxation in 1975 to be equal to 1.7 or to 0.9, depending on the model specification. Stern 
(1977) found an elasticity around 2 for the British income taxation system of the early 1970s. 
Today, political preferences may be for less redistribution, so that we should also consider 
lower values. This has been suggested by experimental evidence, which provides a second 
source. Amiel, Creedy and Hurn (1999) found broad support for median values of the 
elasticity around 0.2. Such experiments typically ask people to think about the elasticity in 
terms of the “leaky bucket” of Okun (1975). Suppose that a transfer costing $1 to a person 
with double mean income is made to a person with half mean income, with 50 cents being lost 
in the process of transfer, so that the recipient only gets 50 cents. Whether or not this “leaky” 
transfer increases social welfare depends on the relative valuation of marginal changes in 
income. An elasticity of 1 means that, compared to the $1 cost to the person with double 
mean income, 4 times the weight is attached to the 50 cents received by the person on half 
average income. So the transfer would raise social welfare. If, on the other hand, the elasticity 
were ½, then the weight would only be twice, and cost and benefit would be equal. Put more 
generally, a loss ℓ is socially acceptable up to the point at which  1 ) 1 ( = −
ε l z , where z is the 
                                                           
8 It should be emphasised that the aim of this procedure is to fix the magnitude of κ. Once chosen, the value of κ 
is kept constant over time. This implies that, as real income grows, the actual elasticity of the social marginal 
value of income must also rise. To keep the elasticity constant over time, we would have to make κ inversely 
proportional to the mean. However, this would change the nature of the index K, which would no longer be 
translation invariant.  
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ratio of the income of the donor to that of the recipient. This mental experiment is helpful in 
thinking about the implications of different values of the elasticity of the social marginal 
value of income, and we consider it again in the next section.  
Applying parameterised measures to the world income distribution 
In applying these measures to the world distribution, we have taken values for the 
elasticity in the interval [0.125, 2.0], which should cover a wide range of social preferences. 
As is clear from Figure 2, adopting different values for ε gives very different measures of the 
cost of world inequality, varying in 1992 from 10 per cent with  8  
  1 = ε  to 74 per cent with 
ε=2. But the time trend does not differ very much from that of the Gini coefficient, shown 
without markers. For the index K, we have assumed in Figure 3 that the values of the 
elasticity apply at the world median income in 1992, estimated from the BM data to be US 
$1,712 at 1990 PPP. Here the cost of inequality is expressed absolutely, and the comparator is 
the absolute Gini coefficient, again shown without markers. The time path of the K index for 
elasticities of 1 and 2 is similar to that for the absolute Gini, and there is no great difference 
between the K index, shown by hollow symbols, and the corresponding absolute version of 
the I index. The time paths for the elasticity of ⅛ show more difference.  
These findings suggest that, applied at a world scale, the major difference between the 
inequality indices I and K lies in expressing the cost of inequality in absolute terms. Of the 
two key stages identified earlier, it is the expression of cost that is crucial. The individual 
functional form plays less of a role.
9 But this is not necessarily the case if we consider a wider 
range of functional forms, to which we now turn. 
3. Sensitivity to different transfers 
In our view, the functional forms considered so far do not allow sufficient flexibility 
when considering the world distribution. This may be seen if we return to the hypothetical 
leaky bucket experiment and the effect of transfers of income at different points in the world 
                                                           
9 The same considerations apply to the “centrist” index introduced by Kolm (1976), and to the intermediate 
indices considered by Bossert and Pfingsten (1990), Zoli (1999), Del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (2000), and Zheng 
(2004). These alternatives are discussed in Atkinson and Brandolini (2004).  
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distribution. The essential problem is that of devising a path for the social marginal valuation 
of income that treats appropriately both transfers within a rich country, such as the United 
States, and transfers between people in rich countries and the poor in poor countries. 
Table 1 shows the location of a selection of different world citizens, or more accurately 
the means for decile groups, according to the BM data for 1992. In each case, income is 
expressed relative to the 1992 world median (US $1,712 at 1990 PPP). Di denotes the i-th 
decile group, with D1 being the lowest, D10 the highest, so that the first line in Table 1 shows 
that the mean income for the first decile for 46 African countries (total population 357 
million) is 0.15 of the world median. At the top, the average income for the top decile group 
in the United States in 1992 is some 40 times the world median. 
Suppose that we now consider the individual social marginal valuation of income, 
expressed initially as an iso-elastic function of income, 
ε − y , so that the social valuation of an 
extra dollar accruing to a person with income y is 
ε 2  times that of an extra dollar accruing to 
a person with income 2y. The implied social marginal valuations of income, expressed as a 
ratio to the social marginal valuation of the median income, are shown for three different 
values of ε in Table 1. As envisaged in the “leaky bucket experiment”, the value of ε 
determines the degree of loss that we are willing to accept when making a redistributive 
transfer. If we start with domestic redistribution in the United States, then, according to the 
BM data, the mean for D6 is four times the mean for D2. Then  2 = ε  implies that a transfer of 
$1 from D6 to D2 would raise social welfare if all but  16 / 1 4 / 1
2 =  leaked away before 
reaching D2, i.e. a loss of up to 93.75 cents would be acceptable. This degree of leakage may 
appear too high. Put another way, the implied social marginal valuation for a person in D2 
would be 16 (
2 4 = ) times that for a person in D6, and the implied marginal valuation for a 
person in D2 would be 196 (
2 14 = ) times that of a person in the US D10 (the mean income 
being 14 times). If we take  1 = ε , then for a transfer of $1 from D6 to D2, the maximum 
acceptable leakage is 75 cents, and the marginal valuation for a person in D2 would be 14 
times that for a person in D10. If we take the central value used by the US Census Bureau 
( 2  
  1 = ε ), then the maximum acceptable leakage for a transfer of $1 from D6 to D2 would fall 
to 50 cents, and the marginal valuation for a person in D2 would be 3¾ times that for a person 
in D10.  
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How does this extend to the world scale? We can see from Table 1 that the average 
income of the top 10 per cent in the United States is some 140 times that of India D1. A value 
of  2  
  1 = ε  implies that a transfer of $1 from the US D10 to India D1 would be acceptable if 
the loss is 92 cents or less: i.e. 8 cents are received. Would such a level of loss be acceptable? 
(It should be noted that we are abstracting here from the issues of agency: that the United 
States has less control over the leakages.) The social marginal valuation of income accruing to 
D1 in India is, with  2  
  1 = ε , nearly 12 times that of a person in the US top 10 per cent. Some 
readers may feel that a lower value of ε should be applied. A value of  4  
  1 = ε  implies that the 
social marginal valuation of income for a person in India D1 would become 3.44 times that of 
a person in the US D10; a value of  8  
  1 = ε  implies that the marginal valuation would become 
1.85 times, and that a loss of up to 46 cents would be acceptable.  
However, we have to consider the implications of low values of ε for the evaluation of 
transfers from other countries to D1 in India. From Table 1, we can see that a relatively low 
income person in Western Europe, say Germany D2, may have an income 12.5 times that of a 
person in D1 in India. A value of  8  
  1 = ε  would imply that the marginal valuation of income 
for D1 in India is only 1.37 times that for a person in D2 in Germany. This will strike many 
people as too low. Moreover, if we were to reduce ε to such low values, it would have 
implications for transfers within the United States. With  8  
  1 = ε , for example, a transfer would 
only be made from D10 to D2 if the leakage was less than 28 cents, which seems a limiting 
requirement. The marginal value of $1 to a person in D2 is being treated as worth only 1.4 
times $1 to a person in D10. (It should be noted that a significant fraction of those in D2 are 
below the official US poverty line.) By adjusting the parameter to fit the world distribution, 
we are in effect squeezing the range of distributional weights applied within the United 
States. Or, if we adopt values more appropriate to the within-country situation, they imply a 
very wide range of marginal valuations on the global scale. With the inverse square law 
( 2 = ε ), for example, the marginal value of income to a person in the bottom decile in India is 
almost 20,000 times that to a person in the top decile in the United States.  
The cause of these difficulties lies in the straitjacket imposed by the assumption of a 
constant elasticity. To quote Little and Mirrlees, “there is no particular reason why [the social 
marginal valuation] should fall at the same proportional rate at all consumption levels. Why  
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should twice as much consumption deserve a quarter of the weight, whether consumption is 
low or high?” (1974, p. 240). As is argued by Anand and Sen (2000), there is a case for 
variable elasticity function such that the elasticity increases with income. As they note, this 
can be achieved by adopting the Kolm absolute index, K. Table 1 shows the marginal 
valuation of income implied by the Kolm index with an elasticity equal to ⅛ at the world 
median. This has a large effect on the marginal valuations within the United States: the 
marginal value of $1 to a person in D2 becomes 90 times that to a person in D10. But it would 
have little effect on the marginal valuations of income for the person in D1 in India relative to 
that of a low income person in Western Europe: it would become 1.48 in place of 1.37. The 
use of the Kolm index is a relaxation of the constant elasticity assumption, but it does not 
allow us to reconcile both ends of the world distribution. The same consideration would apply 
were we to adopt the social welfare function proposed by Anand and Sen (2000) that 
combines the constant relative and constant absolute inequality versions.
10  
The Gini coefficient 
The Gini coefficient, possibly the most used among inequality indices,
11 provides an 
insightful alternative. As seen above, the social marginal valuation implicit in the Gini 
coefficient depends on the income rank order, and is bounded above by 2 and below by zero. 
(In Table 1, this is approximated by the mean rank of all people in each decile group, 
calculated as the sum of the cumulative share of all groups poorer than the one indicated and 
half the population share of the group itself.) The Gini coefficient has another appealing 
property, which may be seen in Figure 4 (corresponding to Table 1). With the Gini index, the 
social marginal valuation of income declines above the 1992 world median in a fashion 
similar to the constant elasticity  1 = ε , but differs at lower values. Initially the marginal 
                                                           
10 They write social welfare as the mean over i of –yi
–α exp(–γyi), where α and γ are non negative. 
11 In the survey by Anand and Segal (2008), the summary table of estimates of global inequality at PPP 
exchange rates contains 10 results with the Gini coefficient, 5 with the Theil entropy index, 5 with the second 
Theil measure (I with the parameter equal to 1), and 4 with the variance of logarithms.   
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valuation falls slowly with income, but it then falls more sharply up to the mode.
12 This 
suggests that we may look for a functional form that has this “slow, quick, slow” property. 
In spite of this property and its popularity, the Gini coefficient has two problems. The 
first is that, unlike the I and K measures, it is not additively separable in incomes. It lacks the 
property that the ratio of the social marginal valuations of income for two persons i and j 
depends only on their incomes. The significance may be seen from an example. Suppose that 
the European Union is considering a switch from a policy transferring $1 to a person in 
Turkey D4 (under a programme for applicant countries) to a policy transferring $1 to a person 
in India D1 (under its development programme). With the Gini weights, the social marginal 
valuation for India D1 is 1.97 times that for Turkey D4 (see Table 1). Between these two 
groups lie the bottom six decile income groups in China. If rapid development in China were 
to shift them above Turkey D4, the fall in the income ranking in the world population would 
cause the social marginal valuation for the Turkish decile group to rise from 0.962 to 1.218. 
As a result, the social marginal valuation for India D1 relative to Turkey D4 would fall by 
over a fifth to 1.55. Incomes in India and Turkey would have remained the same, but the 
attractiveness of the switch in policy would have been affected by development elsewhere. 
This is the argument for assuming additive separability. 
The second problem with the Gini coefficient arises from its treatment of high incomes. 
It is going too far to say that it involves “spiteful egalitarianism” (Feldstein, 2005, p. 12),
13 
but it is true that the Gini weights do tend to zero very fast at the very top of the income scale, 
as can be seen from Table 1. It is not clear that the social marginal valuation for France D9 
should be 2.14 times that for the US D9. We may want to allow for the possibility that the 
social marginal valuation remains strictly above a positive value as income tends to infinity. 
                                                           
12 The kernel estimates of the world distribution of income by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002, Figure 1) 
have a secondary mode, but the broad shapes are consistent with the statement in the text.  
13 Feldstein imagined a situation in which “everyone reading this article received $50 by some magical process 
that did not decrease the income or wealth of anyone else. Since we are an above-income group, national 
inequality would rise. Nevertheless, I think there are few who would reject bestowing this extra wealth on us 
all” (2005, p. 12). Yes, indeed a rise in social welfare is recorded as a result of Feldstein’s magical process when 
evaluated according to the social welfare function corresponding to the Gini coefficient, which is μ(1–G). With 
the Gini coefficient the marginal valuation of income is never negative, and there is no rejection of the Pareto 
principle. Indeed, Sen (1976), in the article in which he demonstrates the μ(1–G) formula, begins from an 
assumption of strict monotonicity, requiring in the case of a finite number of individuals that welfare be strictly 
increasing if there is an increase in the income of anyone.  
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4. Towards a new approach 
The previous discussion provides the rationale that leads us to propose a new measure. 
The objective is to design a measure that combines the “slow, quick, slow” empirical property 
of the Gini coefficient with additive separability, while allowing for a strictly positive social 
marginal valuation of income at all income levels. The second motivation for devising a new 
measure goes back to the objective of integrating the analysis of poverty and inequality. This 
can be achieved by assigning to a particular income level the role of a poverty line, a feature 
not shown by any of the measures considered so far. The identification of a poverty threshold 
within the social welfare function helps us to show that concern about poverty may either be 
because incomes are unequally distributed and some people fall below the poverty line or 
because mean income is below the poverty line (or both). Put differently, poverty may occur 
even if everyone has the same income, if a society is globally poor. Clearly this depends on 
how the poverty line is defined. A society could not be globally poor if the poverty line were 
taken as some percentage (less than 100 per cent) of the mean income. In what follows, we 
consider a variety of approaches. That just described, often referred to as a “relative” poverty 
line may be contrasted with “absolute” poverty lines that are independent of mean income, 
although we should note that “absolute” poverty lines are not necessarily constant over time. 
As has been stressed by Sen (1983), a standard fixed in one evaluative space, such as that of 
capabilities, may imply a poverty line in terms of income that varies over time.  
In order to achieve the objectives of greater flexibility and of integrating poverty and 
inequality, we need to introduce a number of parameters governing the form of the social 
welfare function. Readers may, quite understandably, resist being asked to consider a measure 
of inequality that requires them to think first about the values of different parameters. The 
popularity of the Gini coefficient is in part due to the fact that it requires no parameter be 
specified. However, this does not mean that there are no implicit value judgements underlying 
the Gini coefficient; we have just shown that its properties can be challenged. The virtue of 
parameterisation, as argued in Atkinson (1970), is that it forces the user to make explicit 
choices about the instrument of evaluation and it allows readily for differences of view about 
the importance of redistribution. 
 We propose the following four-parameter measure of global social welfare:  
22 










− ≡ = Σ
− δ β δ − δ β
 
) ( ) (











where β is positive and has the dimension of 1/income, δo and δ have the dimension of 
income, and λ is a non-negative pure number. As a consequence, the expression Σ used to 
evaluate total world welfare has the dimension of income.
14 
  The specification of (1) embodies the two key steps described earlier – the shape of 
the individual function, and the calculation of the welfare cost – both of which involve 
assumptions. The first step is that we have adopted an exponential form that tilts the measure 
in direction of K rather than I. Indeed, as shown below, the Kolm measure may be seen in 
terms of a limiting case of (1). In this sense, Σ is an absolute measure.
15 The first element in 
(1) is the mean income, from which the second term capturing the unequal distribution of 
income, weighted by the parameter λ, is subtracted. In this sense, too, Σ is an absolute 
measure. Note that Σ can be negative. 
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As before, we ignore the divisor n and refer to the square bracket as the individual social 
marginal valuation of income for person i. There are four parameters in (1) and (2), but δ0 
only plays an instrumental role; unless explicitly signalled, we assume that  δ = δ0 , reducing 
to three the parameters that need to be chosen: β, δ and λ.  
 The  parameter  λ captures the differing importance attached to distributional concerns. 
If no weight is attached to distribution, then one simply sets  0 = λ , the social marginal 
valuation is everywhere 1, and that is the end of the story. The implications of different, non-
zero, choices of λ may be seen from considering the fact that (with  δ = δ0 ), the social 
                                                           
14 The social welfare function is assumed to be defined over incomes, not individual utilities. We are not 
asserting that there exists a well-behaved utility function such that the private marginal valuation of income can 
be written in this form. 
15 It would be an interesting extension to consider a version closer to the I measure. We are grateful to Peter 
Hammond for the suggestion that we seek to derive the K or I indices as a limiting case.  
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marginal valuation falls monotonically from  )] 1 /( 1 [
βδ − + λ + e  when  i y  is 0 to 1 as  i y  tends to 
infinity. The social marginal valuation of a person with zero income is at most  ) 1 ( λ +  times 
that for the richest person, so that  4 = λ  corresponds to a maximum ratio of five, which 
implies a maximum socially acceptable loss of 80 per cent from a transfer from the richest to 
the poorest. We take this value of λ in the illustrations below, although, in the light of the 
large world income differences, this may be regarded as a conservative choice. 
The two remaining parameters β and δ determine the nature of our concern for 
inequality and poverty. The specification (1) gives a special status to the income level δ and 
one interpretation, taken up immediately below, is that of a poverty line. Other interpretations 
can however be given, and we show how variations in δ allow the measure to adopt either a 
Kolm-like form or a Gini-like form. The parameter β determines the “angularity” of the 
measure, which has a natural interpretation in each of the cases, which we now discuss in 
turn. As in the following we focus not on incomes but on their ratios to the median m, the 
actual values of the parameters in the income space are δm, δ0m and β/m. 
The poverty gap 
For some people, our concern should be with poverty but not inequality. This position is 
exemplified by Feldstein: “I have no doubt about the appropriateness of transferring income 
to the very poor … the emphasis should be on eliminating poverty and not on the overall 
distribution of income or the general extent of inequality” (2005, p. 12). This position has 
been called “charitable conservatism” (Atkinson, 1990). One of the attractions of the measure 
proposed here is that it encapsulates the poverty gap if we set δ as the poverty line, with 
δ = δ0 , and let β tend to infinity. Under these assumptions, the social welfare function (1) is 
becomes:
16 




)] ( , 0 max[
1 1
0 ,  (1a) 
                                                           
16 As β goes to infinity, if yi≥δ the term (1/β)ln[1+exp(β(δ–yi))] in (1) tends to zero; if yi<δ, application of 
L’Hôpital’s Rule allows the limit to be calculated as (δ–yi).  
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Thus, world welfare is evaluated as the mean minus λ times the aggregate poverty gap per 
head of the total population.
17 As may be seen from (2), as β tends to infinity, with  δ = δ0 , 
the social marginal valuation equals  ) 1 ( λ +  where income is below δ and 1 where it is above 
δ. Distributional concern is concentrated below the poverty line, to an extent that depends on 
λ. Where  4 = λ , we are subtracting four times the poverty gap from national income: the 
multiplication by λ is a way of allowing for the concerns of those who feel that the small size 
of the poverty gap, expressed per head of the total population, understates its significance.  
A less angular version 
With the poverty gap, the social marginal valuation is constant as a function of income 
when income is below the poverty line, falls like a stone at  δ = y , and is then again constant 
for all incomes above the poverty line. For some people, this is too abrupt. We may well want 
to taper the marginal valuation as we approach the poverty line, and to recognise that the 
needs of the “near-poor”, just above the poverty line, are greater than those of people 
comfortably above. The 1991 modification to the Human Development Index (HDI) was 
based on the argument that “the idea of diminishing returns to income is now better captured 
by giving a progressively lower weight to income beyond the poverty cut-off point, rather 
than the zero weight previously given” (United Nations Development Programme, 1991, p. 
15).
18 The HDI modification took the form of a fractional weight above the poverty line, but 
such a “less angular” version can also be achieved using (1) by retaining δ (= δ0) as the 
poverty line, and taking a finite value of β. With β finite, the social marginal valuation 
changes more smoothly around δ. This may be seen from the second derivative 
                                                           
17 Our formulation of the social welfare function in per capita terms implies that world welfare goes up, ceteris 
paribus, whenever the aggregate poverty gap grows less than the population. However, one could argue that 
what matters in the assessment of poverty is the amount of resources necessary to eliminate poverty, i.e. the 
absolute aggregate poverty gap, not its value per head. This corresponds to viewing world poverty as measured 
by the absolute number of the poor rather than their number relative to the total population. Which one of these 
two conceptions of poverty is chosen has important consequences for the interpretation of the evolution of 
poverty and welfare, as the absolute and per head aggregate poverty gaps need not move in the same direction. 
Chakravarty, Kanbur and Mukherjee (2006) attempt to put these two conceptions of poverty together by 
developing a family of poverty measures which avoid the population replication axiom.   
18 We owe this quotation to Anand and Sen (2000), who present an extensive (and sympathetic) critique of the 
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which has its minimum value (i.e. the steepest downward slope for the marginal valuation) at 
δ = i y . Both before and after  δ = i y  the slope is less. The value of β determines how sharply 
the social marginal valuation changes around the point of inflexion. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5, where we have taken the poverty line as 0.5. The marginal valuation at the poverty 
line is  ) 2 / 1 ( λ + , independent of β. All the curves relating to the new measure in Figure 5 
pass through this point since we have taken a common value of  4 = λ . (In order to facilitate 
comparison, the curves for the Kolm and the constant elasticity measures have been rescaled 
to go through this point as well.) The charitable conservative evaluation function is shown by 
the broken lines. With  12 = β , the function is a “smoothed” version of the poverty gap, giving 
some additional weight to people above the poverty line, but the weight falls rapidly away: at 
the world median, the social marginal valuation is indistinguishable from that with the 
poverty gap. With  4 = β , on the other hand, less significance is attached to the poverty line. 
Those with incomes up to three times the poverty line receive a perceptible additional weight, 
which is similar to that assigned to them by the (rescaled) constant elasticity index I with 
1 = ε ; for higher incomes, the social marginal valuation stabilises at 1, the lower bound for 
the new measure, while it keeps declining for the index I. With  4 = β , those below the 
poverty line get lower weight, relative not only to the poverty gap version and the function 
with higher values of β but also to the constant elasticity measure.  
Towards an inequality measure 
If we cease to regard δ as the poverty line, the new measure can represent the views of 
those who are concerned with overall inequality. If we set  0 = δ  (and  0 0 = δ ), then there is 
no interior point of inflexion, and (with  4 = λ ) the social marginal valuation of income has 
the form shown in Figure 6 by the three curves starting from the same value 3 (the social 
valuation at zero income is  ) 2 / 1 ( λ + ). The three curves are based on different values of β and 
illustrate different speeds of approach to the limiting value of 1: the greater β, the more 
rapidly the weight attributed to higher incomes converges to 1. For the range of incomes 
shown in Figure 6, the curve with the lowest value of β (0.5) has some similarity with the  
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Kolm index with an elasticity of 1/5 at the median (after rescaling so that it also starts from 3 
when income is nil).  
There is indeed a close relation with the Kolm index. If we hold  0 0 = δ , but allow δ to 
tend to minus infinity, the individual social marginal valuation of income becomes 
) 1 (
i y e
β − λ + , which for large λ approaches the Kolm form with β corresponding to κ in 
equation (K). As δ tends to minus infinity, equation (1) becomes:  
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The separation of δ0 and δ is introduced to allow this limit to be taken. (The limit may be seen 
from (1) by regarding  ) exp(βδ  as the denominator, and applying L’Hôpital’s Rule.) Arrival at 
a form similar to the Kolm index underlines the absolute rather than relative nature of our 
generalisation, but we should stress the difference remaining where λ is finite: as income goes 
to infinity, the social marginal valuation of income goes to zero in the case of the Kolm index 
while it approaches one with (1b). Thus, the social evaluation of an extra dollar accruing to 
the poorest person relative to an extra dollar accruing to the richest person approaches infinity 
with the Kolm index, while it is at most  ) 1 ( λ +  with our formulation. 
The similarity with the Kolm index is illustrated by the curves in the upper part of 
Figure 6. According to Σ, the elasticity with respect to income of the social marginal 
valuation of income, defined positively, is: 
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The two curves in Figure 6 marked by crosses and squares virtually coincide, within the 
shown income range, with the continuous curves which correspond to the Kolm indices 
having the same elasticity at the median as given by (4), rescaled so to start from the same 
value at zero income. (The two curves would however depart from their Kolm counterparts at 
some higher level of income.) 
Slow, quick, slow 
So far we have allowed δ to vary downwards. If we allow δ to be positive, then we 
obtain a measure with the “slow, quick, slow” property. This is illustrated in Figure 6 by 
setting  1 = δ  (once again equal to δ0) and  6 = β . The key element is the behaviour of the  
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second derivative of the social welfare function. From (3), it may be seen that the third 
derivative of the social welfare function proposed here is first negative (for  δ < i y ) and then 
positive (for  δ > i y ). The literature on transfer “sensitivity” (Atkinson, 1973; Kolm, 1976; 
Davies and Hoy, 1985) showed that the assumption that the third derivative is positive is 
equivalent to the “principle of diminishing transfers”, or third order stochastic dominance. 
Suppose that the two people in the earlier leaky bucket experiment (person 1 poorer than 
person 2) are now each joined by a friend with income h above theirs, and that we 
simultaneously transfer $1 from person’s 1 friend to person 1, and $1 from person 2 to his 
friend. In other words, there are two mean-preserving transfers of the same size, but in 
opposite directions. Then, the principle of diminishing transfers means that we attach more 
weight to the transfer affecting the poorer person, and that social welfare increases (see 
Shorrocks and Foster, 1987, for a more general treatment). With the social welfare function 
proposed here, this principle is assumed to apply at middle and higher incomes, above the 
point of inflexion δ. In contrast, over the initial range of incomes, up to δ, there is increasing 
sensitivity to transfers.  
As in earlier sections, we can seek to calibrate the parameters by considering the 
elasticity of the social marginal valuation. As shown by (4), this varies with income. With 
0 δ = δ , the elasticity at the point of inflexion  δ = i y  is equal to  )] 2 ( 2 /[ λ + λβδ . In Figure 6, 
4 = λ  and  6 = β , so that the elasticity at  1 = δ  is 2. In the example below, we construct a 
Gini-like measure by taking the point of inflexion at twice the world median income,  2 = δ , 
and setting  3 = β ; this leaves the elasticity at the point of inflexion unchanged at 2, but gives 
a much lower elasticity of 0.11 at the median income. With higher values of δ, the flatter, 
initial section applies over a wider range. Indeed, by letting δ go to infinity, we obtain as a 
limiting case that of distributional indifference.  
On the interpretation of the new measure 
The new measure proposed here has been motivated as embodying a desired pattern of 
change in the social marginal valuation of income. But how is the new measure to be 
interpreted? Its interpretation may be aided by re-arranging the expression for social welfare.  
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By adding and subtracting from (1) the term  [ ]
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The first term on the right hand side of (5),  ) (μ Σ is the level of social welfare attained if 
everyone has an income equal to the mean μ. In general, this level of social welfare is less 
than μ, although it approaches μ as the mean tends to infinity (with the poverty gap, it is equal 
to μ once the mean passes the poverty line). This reflects the fact that it is a welfare measure, 
and that there are diminishing returns in the transformation of income into welfare. The 
second term, denoted by σ, represents the costs of income differences: it may be seen that the 
term reduces to zero where all incomes are equal to the mean.  
The way in which our new measure differs from earlier approaches can be illustrated by 
taking the simple example in Figure 7. If there are two people, with incomes (measured on the 
horizontal axis) as shown, and mean μ, the achieved level of social welfare is given by the 
point C (the midpoint). Welfare is measured on the vertical axis. The I and K measures 
proceed by calculating the equally-distributed equivalent income ye (obtained by reading 
across horizontally from C to the point D), and the cost of inequality is the loss CD. Unlike 
the I and K social welfare functions, however, the new measure developed here has the same 
dimension as income. This implies that we can directly compare the level of welfare Σ with 
the mean income μ, and there is no need to introduce the equally-distributed equivalent 
income. The overall difference between μ and Σ, GC, is made up of two components, GF and 
FC: GF reflects the diminishing returns in the transformation of income into welfare, and 
shrinks as income grows; FC measures the cost of inequality, which is the second term in (5).  
In the case of the poverty gap, the curve in Figure 7 becomes a kinked line, coinciding 
with the 45
o line from the level δ of the poverty income onwards. In this case, the distance GC 
is λ times the aggregate poverty gap per head. This gap consists, potentially, of two 
components, either of which may be zero. Where the mean income is above the poverty line, 
poverty is due entirely to the unequal distribution of income. If the mean income is below the 
poverty line, there can be both aggregate (corresponding to the difference between μ and 
) (μ Σ ) and distributional poverty. There can remain aggregate poverty even where incomes  
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are equalised. Indeed, if everyone has an income below the poverty line, then the component 
FC disappears even though income differences remain (since the poverty gap is unaffected by 
transfers of income among people below the poverty line). The problem of poverty can 
therefore be seen as a problem of distribution and/or a problem of the overall level of income. 
These observations highlight the crucial role played by δ, when seen as the poverty line. δ 
(and δ0) could be defined as a fraction of mean income – a purely relative approach – that we 
do not explore here. On an absolute approach, δ (and δ0) is independent of mean income, but, 
as noted earlier, this does not imply that it should be kept constant over a long period of time. 
Where the underlying concern relates to a more fundamental space, such as the achievement 
of a level of functionings, the necessary level of income may be changing as a result of 
economic and social progress. We return to this issue in the next section. 
In the general case, we are not concerned with the component GF, but only with the 
costs of inequality FC. With regard to the latter it is instructive to see how our measure 
departs from Kolm’s absolute approach. The Kolm index K measures the costs of inequality 
as the absolute difference between the mean and the equally-distributed equivalent income: 
K
e y K − μ = . With expression (5), we express the cost of inequality as the difference between 
the social welfare at the mean  ) (μ Σ  and the social welfare for the actual income distribution 
Σ. As by definition the social welfare at the equally-distributed equivalent income equals Σ, 
we are basically taking  ) ( ) ( e y Σ − μ Σ  instead of  e y − μ  as the cost of the unequal distribution 
of income. For our Kolm-like measure defined by (1b), this term equals  β λ −
β βμ − / ) 1 (
K e e , 
where K is the Kolm index with  β = κ . For given mean income the two measures generate the 
same ranking, but the cost of inequality defined here is smoothed out by a rise in mean 
income. Raising all incomes by $1 leaves the Kolm index unchanged by construction but 
reduces the costs of inequality with our Kolm-like measure, and it does so at a decreasing rate 
as mean income rises: the richer the economy, the less an extra $1 is worth. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that our inequality measure σ is decomposable by population 
subgroups (see Cowell, 1980; Shorrocks, 1980): 










+ σ = σ μ − δ β
μ − δ β
δ − δ β










0  (6)  
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where subscript j refers to the J mutually exclusive subgroups of the population, and wj is the 
population share of subgroup j. The first term on the right hand side of (6) is the population 
weighted average of within-group inequalities, while the second term is the between-group 
inequality, that is the inequality calculated after assuming that to each member in a group is 
attributed the group mean income. In the case of the poverty gap measure (1a), the 
decomposition is: 
  ∑ ∑ μ − δ λ − μ − δ λ + σ = σ δ = δ →∞ β j j j j j j w w )] ( , 0 max[ )] ( , 0 max[
0 ,  (6a) 
When the overall mean is above the poverty line, the between-group component is λ times the 
weighted average of the aggregate poverty indicator, that is the difference  ) ( j μ − δ  if 
positive; when the overall mean falls short of the poverty line, the aggregate poverty indicator 
must be subtracted from this sum. The decomposability property proves useful in the analysis 
of world income distribution to evaluate the contribution of a country, or a group of countries, 
to the evolution of global inequality. 
Summary 
Our aim in introducing the new measure has been to provide a more flexible approach 
to measuring inequality and poverty. This allows us to “blend” different concerns, rather than 
treat them as incommensurable. The price has been the introduction of four parameters – 
three, if we consider only those playing a substantive role – each of which has to be specified, 
but which allow us to encompass a variety of different positions regarding the first of the two 
key steps in defining an inequality measure. This is illustrated in the next section in terms of 
four “alternatives”. We begin with a version (Alternative 1) close to the poverty gap, where 
the primary focus is poverty, and then move to a measure (Alternative 2) centred on the 
poverty line but allowing a tapering for the near-poor. By varying the δ parameters, we can 
then consider inequality measures that resemble the Kolm type (Alternative 3) or the Gini 
type (Alternative 4). The parameter values are listed in the headings to the final four columns 
in Table 1 and the characterisation of the four alternatives is summarised graphically in 
Figure 8.   
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5. The new approach applied to inequality among world citizens 
We now apply the alternative measure suggested above to the evidence about world 
inequality. The pattern of the social marginal valuation of income is illustrated in the final 
four columns of Table 1, under the heading “Alternatives 1-4”, where we have taken the 
maximum acceptable leakage to be 80 per cent ( 4 = λ ).The first two Alternatives take δ as 
the poverty line, assumed to be half world median income in 1992, and set δ0 equal to δ. With 
Alternative 1, β has a high value, corresponding to the position of a person concerned about 
poverty but not about inequality (in the direction of the poverty gap version). The social 
marginal valuation of income falls sharply once the poverty line is reached, and is essentially 
constant above world median income. Alternative 2, with a smaller value of β (=4) 
corresponds to a less angular position. Below the poverty line, the social marginal valuation is 
lower than with Alternative 1, but it crosses at the poverty line. For incomes up to the world 
median, the weight attached to marginal income is at least 40 per cent higher than that 
attached to marginal income in the United States. In contrast, Alternatives 3 and 4 break the 
link between δ and the poverty line, and tend towards measures of inequality. Letting  4 − = δ  
(and 0 0 = δ ) takes us in the direction of the Kolm index K. Alternative 4 goes in the opposite 
direction, setting  2 0 = δ = δ  with  3 = β , which generates a Gini-like inequality measure (but 
with additive separability and decomposability by population subgroups). As may be seen, the 
social marginal valuation falls first slowly and then more quickly: it exhibits first increasing 
and then decreasing sensitivity to transfers. The difference in transfer sensitivity is 
particularly important when we consider the world scale of incomes. As may be seen from 
Table 1, individual countries may lie largely within the increasing or the decreasing phase. 
Even so, Alternative 4 is consistent with substantial redistribution within the United States: 
the social marginal valuation for D1 is more than three times that for the US median. 
These four Alternative measures are applied to the world income estimates of the BM 
database. Figure 9 shows the evolution of world social welfare from 1820 to 1992, where, as 
in equation (1), welfare has the dimension of per capita income, and we express its value as a 
percentage of the world median income in 1992. As noted earlier, welfare may be negative, 
and this was the case for all four alternatives until the beginning of the twentieth century. In 
the case of the poverty line measures, we are applying a contemporary (1992) standard, so  
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that it is scarcely surprising that the earlier values are so low, but the inequality measures are 
also absolute in the sense that we described in the previous section. This applies not only to 
Alternative 3, approaching the Kolm index, but also to the Gini-like Alternative 4. Indeed the 
Gini-like measure is initially off the scale. All four measures indicate a considerable 
improvement over the period, driven by the growth of mean income (the thick top line). 
However, while the upward tendency was similar, the rates of increase in social welfare 
differed from those in mean income. For example, the (absolute) annual increase in mean 
income between 1980 and 1992 was double that between 1890 and 1910, but the rise in social 
welfare using the Gini-like index was only a quarter higher. Distributionally-adjusted income, 
as with our social welfare measure, may give a rather different picture of different historical 
periods. 
The absolute cost of inequality σ is given in Figure 10, again expressed as a percentage 
of the 1992 world median, so that a value of 100 corresponds to a cost of US $1,712 per 
person. There are six panels in Figure 10: one for each of the four Alternatives considered, 
and one each for the poverty gap measures defined in (1a) with δ set at 0.5 and 1 (referred to 
as Alternatives 5 and 6). Notice that these latter two values correspond to the $1 a day and $2 
a day poverty lines, respectively, as defined by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002). In all six 
panels of Figure 10 the continuous lines correspond to the total cost of inequality, while the 
dashed lines indicate the within-country inequality, that is the population-weighted average of 
inequality calculated within the 33 countries or groups of countries included in the BM 
database. With Alternative 1, whose parameters lead in the direction of the poverty gap, we 
see that the cost due to inequality rises until 1890, and then declines, more rapidly after the 
Second World War. The time path with the less angular version represented by Alternative 2 
and the Kolm-like version represented by Alternative 3 also have an inverse-U shape, but the 
peak cost of inequality is reached much later, in 1950. In contrast, with the Gini-like measure 
the cost due to inequality increases steadily, very rapidly between 1950 and 1970, and reaches 
a peak in 1980. (It should be reminded that the Gini-like measure is not the same as the Gini 
coefficient: the social marginal valuation of income received by one person does not depend 
on what is happening elsewhere in the distribution.) Thus, the two inequality versions of our 
measure, the Kolm-like and the Gini-like, move in opposite directions after 1950. If we 
compare the two poverty gap measures represented by Alternatives 5 and 6 with Alternatives  
33 
1 and 2, we find that they all share the same inverse-U shape, in particular the steep 
downward trend since 1950, though they differ in the time of the turning point as well as in 
the size of the change. With the $1 a day poverty line, the turning point was 1870; with the $2 
a day line, it is in the twentieth century. 
For all six Alternatives, the cost due to inequality within each country grouping is far 
more stable than the total, suggesting that the secular variation of the total cost is largely 
driven by changing income differences across countries. Notice, however, how a significant 
rise of within-country inequality from 1970 to 1992 offset the international convergence in 
mean incomes. The less angular poverty measure and the Kolm-like inequality measure level 
off, and the $2 a day poverty gap and the Gini-like inequality measure show a rise. 
The results described above assume that the cost is measured in absolute terms. Figure 
11 shows that some differences arise if the cost is measured as a proportion of mean income. 
The peaks with the less angular version (Alternative 2) and with the Kolm-like measure 
(Alternative 3) come earlier – towards the end of the nineteenth century. The relative cost due 
to inequality with the Gini-like measure also reaches its maximum earlier, in 1960, and then 
falls thereafter. But the differences are nothing like as striking as those we found in the case 
of the standard measures with which we started the paper. 
These evaluations are based on a value of δ kept constant across the whole period 1820-
1992. In the two poverty line cases, δ is assumed to be half the world median income in 1992. 
This value sets a very high standard: in 1820 only western European countries, the United 
States and Argentina-Chile enjoyed a mean income in excess of δ. It is reasonable to wonder 
how our results would change, should we relax this extreme absolutist hypothesis by varying 
the poverty standard over time in relation to economic and social progress. We therefore show 
in Figure 12 the consequences of recomputing our measure retaining the value of δ for 1992, 
but assuming that it grew over time as the median world income. This amounts to applying 
the values indicated in Table 1 to the median income in each year, rather than to the median 
income in 1992, but it should be stressed that we are not assuming that the poverty line is 
proportionate to median, or mean, incomes; rather we are taking the increase in median 
income as a reference point. The (externally-derived) time-variation in δ may involve a faster 
or slower rate of growth. All other parameters are kept unchanged. As shown in Figure 12, 
under a time-varying δ the secular pattern of world income inequality looks considerably  
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different from the one reported earlier for all poverty-type measures, both Alternatives 1 and 
2, and Alternatives 5 and 6: the inverse-U shape turns into a steadily ascending trend, which 
only flattens out after 1980. The impact is instead barely visible on the two inequality-type 
measures, except for the upward trend of the Gini-like measure, now continuing even after 
1970. Assuming a time-varying δ affects also the within-country component, which tends to 
account for a much larger share of the overall inequality: in Alternatives 1 and 5 it almost 
wipes out the between-country component. 
To sum up, contrary to what is suggested by the earlier analysis using the standard 
inequality indices, the conclusions do depend very much on distributional judgments.  
6. Conclusions 
The effects of “globalisation” on world income inequality have been much debated in 
recent years. In the literature, as noted by Anand and Segal, “no consensus emerges 
concerning the direction of change in global inequality in the last twenty to thirty years” 
(2008, p. 61). Some commentators have stressed the impressive growth performance of some 
emerging economies, like China, India and other countries in South East Asia, and have 
concluded that world inequality and poverty must have decreased. Others have countered that 
these impressive rates of growth have not yet translated into absolute increases of size 
comparable to that of developed economies, given the very different levels of GDP per head. 
Thus, world income gaps must have risen. In this paper, we have argued that – before we can 
make such judgments – we need to re-examine the foundations of inequality measurement. 
The sheer scale of global income differences means, in our view, that we cannot simply carry 
over the tools applied to inequality measurement at a domestic level. In the discourse about 
global justice, we have to consider both poverty and inequality and their inter-relation, and we 
have to consider the different meanings of “absolute” and “relative”. 
Differences of view about the evolution of world inequality and poverty stem in part 
from differences as to how they should be measured. Adopting for the purposes of this paper 
a welfarist approach (without endorsing this as the only possible approach), we have sought 
to provide a framework for considering the cost of world inequality and poverty that  
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encompasses different types of concern.
19 In part, these differences of view are presentational: 
whether the cost is expressed in absolute terms or relative to mean incomes. This may make a 
rhetorical difference, but otherwise seems inessential. Our first findings, in Section 2, 
suggested that the differences in conclusions regarding changes in world inequality could be 
largely attributed to how the cost is expressed. However, we argued in Section 3 that the 
existing measures of inequality impose too tight constraints on the way in which the social 
marginal valuation varies with income; moreover they provide no ready means to integrate 
the analysis of poverty and inequality.  
In order to encompass the extent of global income differences and to allow for concerns 
about poverty as well as inequality, we proposed in Section 4 a new parameterised measure of 
global social welfare. This measure has, in a sense explained, an absolute structure (and it 
would be interesting to consider the parallel, relative measure), but it is sufficiently flexible to 
include a variety of different value systems and to incorporate a poverty line. By including 
several approaches within a single measure, we can not only understand better their inter-
relation but also obtain measures that “blend” different concerns. People differ, for example, 
in the relative importance they attach to poverty and inequality. This difference appears 
fundamental, but can be embedded within the new measure proposed here. Letting one of the 
key parameters increase allows the measure to take on a poverty gap form, whereas lower 
values permit a less angular version of the poverty gap, tapering the measure for the near-
poor. If we allow other parameters to vary, we can introduce more general concerns about 
inequality. These may follow the pattern of standard welfare-based measures, with declining 
sensitivity to transfers as we move up the income scale. Or, they may exhibit first increasing 
and then decreasing sensitivity to transfers, mimicking the Gini coefficient but with the 
property of additive separability (and subgroup decomposability). The new measure can 
accommodate a constant poverty line or one varying over time in relation to economic and 
social development, an alternative that has considerable consequences for the interpretation of 
the evolution of the world income distribution. Finally, we can vary the overall weight 
                                                           
19 The new measure has applications outside the present field. In a paper presented at the Conference in honour 
of Claude Henry in Paris in December 2006, one of us (ABA) discussed the implications of the functional form 
for the choice of social discount rate in measuring the costs of global warming. Adoption of a non-constant 
elasticity form seems an evident way of resolving some of the disagreements in this area.  
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attached to distributional issues. A person may, for example, be concerned about poverty but 
not attach a great deal of weight to this consideration, relative to the size of the cake. Or a 
person may feel that, in the context of world poverty, little weight should be attached to 
additional income attached to those at the very top of the distribution. Stated more 
pragmatically, the new measure can exhibit a willingness to redistribute within rich countries 
without magnifying to an implausible degree the willingness to make transfers across the 
whole spectrum of world incomes.   
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Table 1 
World incomes in 1992 expressed relative to the world median and social marginal valuation of income 
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0.15  46 African countries D1  44.444  6.667 1.268 1.112 1.988 4.893 2.850 2.571 1.036 
0.20 Nigeria  D2  25.000  5.000  1.223 1.105 1.968 4.846 2.759 2.388 1.036 
0.28 India  D1  12.755  3.571  1.172  1.094 1.892 4.687 2.592 2.131 1.035 
0.34 Philippines-Thailand  D1  8.651  2.941 1.144 1.086 1.760 4.445 2.451 1.963 1.034 
0.40 Indonesia  D1  6.250  2.500  1.121 1.078 1.711 4.034 2.299 1.815 1.033 
0.48 Mexico  D1  4.340  2.083  1.096 1.067 1.578 3.207 2.086 1.642 1.031 
0.59 Philippines-Thailand  D3  2.873  1.695 1.068 1.053 1.371 1.994 1.790 1.446 1.028 
0.68 Russia  D1  2.163  1.471  1.049  1.041 1.294 1.400 1.564 1.315 1.024 
0.76 China  D5  1.731  1.316  1.035  1.030 1.211 1.158 1.384 1.216 1.020 
0.80 Indonesia  D3  1.563  1.250  1.028 1.025 1.162 1.096 1.304 1.173 1.017 
0.88 Egypt  D4  1.291  1.136  1.016  1.015 1.059 1.031 1.163 1.095 1.012 
1.01  North Africa D4  0.980  0.990  0.999 0.999 0.995 0.999 0.989 0.993 0.999 
1.11 Turkey  D4  0.812  0.901  0.987 0.986 0.962 0.993 0.894 0.931 0.986 
1.27  37 Latin American countries D7  0.620 0.787 0.971 0.967 0.866 0.991 0.796 0.853 0.956 
1.40  45 Asian countries D6  0.510  0.714 0.959 0.951 0.807 0.990 0.749 0.807 0.921 
1.49 Mexico  D5  0.450  0.671  0.951 0.941 0.759 0.990 0.728 0.781 0.891 
1.57 Portugal-Spain  D1  0.406  0.637  0.945 0.931 0.737 0.990 0.714 0.761 0.860 
1.68 Poland  D4  0.354  0.595  0.937  0.919 0.709 0.990 0.701 0.739 0.809 
1.76 US  D1  0.323  0.568  0.932  0.909 0.681 0.990 0.695 0.726 0.767 
2.00 Brazil  D7  0.250  0.500  0.917  0.882 0.602 0.990 0.684 0.696 0.624 
2.36 Germany  D1  0.180  0.424  0.898 0.844 0.516 0.990 0.679 0.672 0.419 
2.77 US  D2  0.130  0.361  0.880  0.802 0.472 0.990 0.677 0.659 0.283 
3.03 Italy  D2  0.109  0.330  0.871  0.776 0.425 0.990 0.677 0.655 0.244 
3.44 Germany  D2  0.085  0.291  0.857 0.737 0.402 0.990 0.677 0.651 0.219 
7.02 Italy  D5  0.020  0.142  0.784  0.471 0.238 0.990 0.677 0.649 0.208 
9.19 US  D5  0.012  0.109  0.758  0.359 0.164 0.990 0.677 0.649 0.208 
10.01 Germany  D7  0.010  0.100  0.750 0.324 0.149 0.990 0.677 0.649 0.208 
11.08 US  D6  0.008  0.090  0.740  0.284 0.131 0.990 0.677 0.649 0.208 
14.79 France  D9  0.005  0.068  0.714  0.178 0.069 0.990 0.677 0.649 0.208 
20.66 US  D9  0.002  0.048  0.685  0.086 0.032 0.990 0.677 0.649 0.208 
38.79 US  D10  0.001  0.026 0.633 0.009 0.005 0.990 0.677 0.649 0.208 
 
Source:  authors’ elaboration on the BM database.. 
(1) As income refers to the mean income of each decile group (as a ratio to the world median), in the expression 
for the social marginal valuation of income the term (2i–1)/n represents the mean rank of all people in the decile 
group and is calculated as the sum of the cumulative share of all groups poorer than the one indicated and half 
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Source:  authors’ elaboration on the BM database.. 
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Figure 3 
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normalised by the value it takes at the world median.  
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Figure 5 
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Source:  authors’ elaboration on the BM database..  
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Figure 11 
Evolution of the relative cost of world inequality, 1820-1992: Alternatives 1-4 













































































































































































































































































Source:  authors’ elaboration on the BM database..  
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Figure 12 
Evolution of the absolute cost of world inequality, 1820-1992: Alternatives 1-4, time-variable δ 
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